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At some point in Empire,
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
reflect on the possibility of a concrete
political alternative to Empire. The
authors refuse that such an effective
blueprint can emerge from theory and
argue that it will instead emerge from
practice. Indeed, they claim that as
well as “Marx needed the Paris
Commune in order to make the leap
and conceive communism in concrete
terms as an effective alternative to
capitalist society” (2000: 206),
comparable experiments are necessary
to become more concrete and think of
an existing alternative beyond Empire.
Although intertwined, a gap to be filled
is open between theory and practice.
Empire represents an ambitious
conceptualization of the global modes
of production and governance which
introduce new mechanisms of
domination beyond the nation-state.
Whilst Hardt and Negri call for
overcoming many debates within the
left (on rejecting the adequacy of
theories on modernity, imperialism or
postcolonialism), their conceptu-
alization of the new form of global
governance contrasts with the limited
elaboration of a theory and a praxis of
the counter- Empire. However, the
of Hardt and Negri has entered into
dialogue with emerging alternatives to
Empire, and their theoretical
reflections echo the initiatives and
practices of social movements. The
path of the “becoming-Prince” of the
multitude has been portrayed
differently from the nomadic alter-
globalization movement and the tactics
of counter-summits in Empire (2000) to
Multitude (2004) where the peace
movement was already replacing the
alter-globalization one. The progressive
governments in Latin America were the
object of the conceptualization of
GlobAL (2006) by Antonio Negri and
Giuseppe Cocco. Commonwealth came
closest to the formulation of a political
project in which the common (and its
institutions) played a central role. But,
if something is comparable with the
Paris Commune at a global scale it is
the cycle of social protests initiated in
2011. Declaration (2012) was a quick
response to that and Assembly (2017)
a later one. Rather than a disruption,
the new cycle enables Hardt and Negri
to deepen an alternative to state
sovereignty and political
representation in the form of
constituent exodus by the creation of
stateless or non-sovereign institutions.
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The intellectual project instigated by
Empire 20 years ago is still a refreshing
combination of theoretical and
practice-based knowledge, combined
with a renewed dose of optimism, to
account for global dominance and
resistance. In a similar way that Negri
and Hardt have rejected other theories
about progressive emancipatory
political and social projects, other
authors have rejected drastically the
premises and framework of Empire.
This is the case of Ernesto Laclau
(2008) who, in his critique of Empire,
rejects the immanence of the
multitude as a central category to think
Empire and the multitude and
concludes that politics are unthinkable
within such a framework. This is not
totally surprising, taking into
consideration that Hardt and Negri
express their disagreement with Laclau
due to his transcendent rather than
immanent approach. In political terms,
the differences can be traced along the
debate between taking the power or
not, particularly intense in the Latin
American context, and reflected
theoretically in divergent positions:
one year after the publication of
Multitude, Laclau published On
Populist Reason. The political
conjuncture revitalized the debate
after the 2011 protests and the later
emergence of left-wing parties
adopting a left-wing strategy in
Europe. In this case, Mouffe’s book For
a Left Populism (2018), published one
year after Assembly, highlighted the
discrepancies. It must be said that
Hardt and Negri, despite not sharing
their premises, sympathized with these
progressive political processes, first in
Latin America and later in Europe.
However, similar dichotomies have
been repeated: unity vs. plurality,
autonomy vs. hegemony, horizontal vs.
vertical, movement vs. party, Empire
(or globalization) vs. nation-state, etc.
Besides reaffirming pre-existing
perspectives, the discussion can hardly
be characterized as a productive
dialogue. Therefore, I would like to
consider some of the main
contributions made by Hardt and Negri
to rethinking the shortcomings (and
potentials?) of populism. This is not the
same as saying that Hardt and Negri
would support any kind of populist
conceptualization, because they would
not, but rather that some of their
points can be useful to reflect on the
role of the political left and, more
specifically, on the recent development
of left-wing populism.
Globalization and the State
Since Hardt and Negri moved the
political field to Empire and claimed a
new sovereignty, the imperial
sovereignty, there is only one way to
combat efficiently towards Empire:
globally. This is, indeed, an interesting
starting point since the roots of
inequality and dominance are
considered to be global, which can be
quite similar to the claims of populism,
but, in contrast, state sovereignty is
not the solution to fight against
globalization. The organization of
resistance, the counter-Empire, should
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be global. Although the focus on the
global is qualified with increasing local
attention, the national arena is not an
arena for social and political struggles.
Whilst populist theory fails to connect
scales beyond the national (the
transnational is used to point to the
enemy rather than to articulate a
common subject), Hardt and Negri
disregard it and acknowledge the
global as the only valid alternative to
Empire and the local as the space of
the (re)production of the common.
Therefore, the only options which can
be considered real alternatives or
resistance to Empire are those which
are connected to the global scale and
not limited to other scales. In other
words, even the defense of autonomy
as a local project must be linked to the
resistance against Empire:
We believe that toward the end of
challenging and resisting Empire and its
world market, it is necessary to pose
any alternative at an equally global
level. Any proposition of a particular
community in isolation, defined in
racial, religious, or regional terms,
“delinked” from Empire, shielded from
its powers by fixed boundaries, is
destined to end up as a kind of ghetto.
Empire cannot be resisted by a project
aimed at a limited, local autonomy. We
cannot move back to any previous
social form, nor move forward in
isolation. Rather, we must push
through Empire to come out the other
side (2000: 206).
In the 00s, the position of Hardt and
Negri was already controversial within
the left. The global as battlefield
implied relegating the national scale to
a second place, and together with that
the aspiration to take power or the
predominance of political actors. The
acceptance of the global scale as the
only option to resist, and at some
undetermined moment to overcome it,
cannot be detached from the
insufficiency of taking power of
national government as an efficient
strategy to defeat Empire. In times
when the alter-globalization movement
was being shaped, the internal debates
showed division around how to address
globalization: trying to recover state
sovereignty or forging a global
alternative. Hardt and Negri were
obviously in favor of the latter and
were already critical towards
individualized leadership, the return to
the state and taking power. In the
aftermath of the protests of 2011,
Hardt and Negri reiterated their
position and, particularly with the
emergence of left-wing populist parties
in Europe, continued their rejection of
the state-oriented strategy. Populism
can only be reactive. This does not
mean that left-wing populism cannot
produce positive changes and
transform people’s lives for good.
However, it is limited how much it can
reach, since it is not offering an
alternative to Empire. It is not reactive
in the same way as right-wing
populism, but still maintains the illusion
of solving the global challenges by
recovering state control.
Hardt and Negri showed indeed an
early understanding of the divide
between winners and losers of
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globalizations that would characterize
the discourses of right-wing populism.
In their usual provocative style, Hardt
and Negri notice the geographical
distribution of global hierarchy in
relation to the opposition between
postmodernists and fundamentalists.
Postmodernists perceive mobility,
indeterminacy and hybridity as
liberation, whilst fundamentalists see it
as exacerbation of their suffering.
Fundamentalism includes right-wing
nationalist-populist parties like Front
National, Christian fundamentalists in
the US and the Islamic Brothers. The
scope and means of the examples are
quite disparate and this weakens the
explanation of right-wing populism as a
contemporary phenomenon, not
related to other types of extremisms. It
reminds us of the distinction made by
Manuel Castells (2004) between
reactive and proactive social
movements when he exemplifies the
former with the Zapatistas, the
American militia, Aum Shinrikyo and Al-
Qaeda. These groups, as insurgents
against the global order, have a
resistance identity and are stigmatized
by the logic of domination. Their main
common feature is that they are
identity-based mobilizations. The global
framework entails here a major
simplification of the nature and
struggles of the selected examples, but
like Hardt and Negri, Castells considers
that these groups are not capable of
assuming globalization as the new
order. However, Hardt and Negri offer
a primarily economic explanation (the
transformations of the global economy
and the mobility of capital) rather than
an identitarian one as proposed by
Castells. The losers of globalization are
“the strongest indication of the
transformation in progress” (2000:
150). Furthermore, Hardt and Negri
refer to the winners of globalization to
highlight the need of an alternative
globalization without deriving into the
return of the state. Antagonism
happens at the global scale at two
levels: against those who take
advantage of globalization and against
those who reclaim the national level.
I would like to emphasize that the
divide between winners and losers of
globalization anticipated the idea of
“progressive neoliberalism”, utilized by
Nancy Fraser, to explain the victory of
Trump not only as a revolt against
global finance. To Fraser, progressive
neoliberalism is “an alliance of
mainstream currents of new social
movements (feminism, anti-racism,
multiculturalism, and LGBTQ rights), on
the one side, and high-end ‘symbolic’
and service-based business sectors
(Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and
Hollywood), on the other” (2017). The
combination of progressive forces and
the forces of cognitive capitalism
meant that values such as diversity and
empowerment were appropriated by
capitalism to serve profitable goals far
from any emancipatory project. Hardt
and Negri express that convergence
more brutally by claiming that
postmodernist theories pave the way
for the transformation of the internal
structures of capitalist organizations
(2000: 153), since organizations
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nowadays must be mobile, flexible and
able to deal with difference. Thus, big
companies seem both progressive and
postmodern. The existence of winners
of globalization, rooted in
postmodernism, is useful to explain the
populist reaction against progressive
neoliberalism or the neoliberal elites.
However, it should not be forgotten
that Hardt and Negri see this dynamic
as the indicator of the transformation
to Empire. Thus, one group is enjoying
the advantages of globalization and the
other one feels excluded and
marginalized, but none of them is the
solution: neither the apparent
progressivism coming from
postmodern elites nor the retreat to
state by populism.
The rejection of the dichotomy
between inside and outside and the
claim that there is no outside Empire
are, indeed, the main obstacles to
making the return to the state the
priority of a progressive and
emancipatory project. I would say that
this is the principal reason for the
distancing from left-wing populism or
any alternative relying on the attempt
to recover state sovereignty. Besides
the differences between ‘the people’
and multitude, populism, following
Hardt and Negri’s reasoning, is not
capable of redefining other spaces than
the nation. This idea is clear when they
show how the alternative conception of
sovereignty runs up against the idea
that the nation was no longer a space
to expand sovereignty, overcoming
barriers and boundaries to facilitate
equality and free circulation. Here the
conception of ‘the people’ deployed by
Hardt and Negri does not fall away
from the one of populist theory. ‘The
people’ is created and detached from
the nation: “The new democracy had to
destroy the transcendental idea of the
nation with all its racial divisions and
create its own people, defined not by
old heritages but by a new ethics of the
construction and expansion of the
community” (2000: 172). The
difference is, obviously, that the
expansion is immanent and originates
in the exodus of the multitude and that
the resulting space (or non-space) is
the one of the Empire (not the nation).
Nonetheless, the construction of ‘the
people’ through means distinctive from
heritage (connected with nationalism),
unified in a plural community, is quite
interesting to explore. The lack of a
transnational dimension is, without any
doubt, one of the major challenges in
forging an alternative to globalization.
The retreat to national sovereignty (in
the form of popular sovereignty) makes
such a transnational expansion difficult.
That said, both the perspectives of
Hardt and Negri and of populism are
needed to reconsider multi-scalar
politics. The displacement to Empire
cannot ignore the centrality of the
national scale to articulate local and
global resistances. It is quite unclear
that accelerating the dismantling of
nation-states is going to lead to a new
phase of Empire without nation-states.
On the other hand, focusing on the
importance of the states is not going to
offer complete solutions to the global
dynamics. No wonder both strategies
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face severe problems to be translated
into durable and consistent processes
of social and political change.
Multitude and the People
Probably the most obvious difference
between Hardt and Negri’s and the
populist approaches relies on the
subject of change: the multitude or the
people. The starting point is quite
similar according to Hardt and Negri
(2017): the recognition of the
heterogeneity of the social field and
the consequent impossibility of
unifying all the subjectivities in one
single subject or struggle. The
commonalities, in principle, end here.
According to the authors of Empire,
Laclau rejects the immanence and the
possibility of the multiplicity of social
subjectivities organizing themselves
and creating lasting institutions.
Instead, Laclau would promote the
terrain of transcendence through
hegemony as the form of organizing
the multiple social subjectivities into
the empty signifier ‘the people’. The
disagreement consists of organizing a
unified subject from above
(transcendence) or organizing social
subjectivities themselves as a multitude
(immanence). Complementarily,
hegemony is the operation to impose
unity into multiplicity, and autonomy
becomes the expression of the plurality
of subjectivities and the institutions
they create. The opposition between
multitude and ‘the people’ continues to
accumulate dichotomies (immanence
vs. transcendence, multiplicity vs. unity,
autonomy vs. hegemony) and other
ones could be added such as
expression vs. representation. The
conclusion is that Laclau’s intellectual
project is elaborated within the
framework of modern sovereignty and
is not capable of offering a satisfactory
project to deal with the times of
Imperial sovereignty. The initial
recognition of a common assumption
(the heterogeneity of the social field)
turns merely anecdotal, given that both
are presented in opposing terms and
the space for dialogue is almost
inexistent. The series of incompatible
dichotomies presents two very
different projects, despite the fact that
social and political practices prove the
fluidity and interconnection between
the actors who participate in autonomy
or hegemonic operations or, in other
words, who aspire to implement the
institutions of the common and
sympathize and participate in left-wing
populist strategies oriented towards
taking power. This does not mean that
the interconnection is not fraught with
contradictions but, at least, there are
spaces to confront and maybe settle
such contradictions.
In a similar way to Hardt and Negri,
Paolo Virno elaborates a clear
distinction between multitude and
people in his book A Grammar of the
Multitude (2004). Virno shows
disposition to recover the use of
multitude since people has been the
prevailing one. The two polarities are
attributed to Spinoza and Hobbes as
putative fathers. For Spinoza the
multitudo is a plurality which persists as
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such without converging into a One and
is the architrave of civil liberties.
Hobbes, in Virno’s words, detests the
multitude for being perceived as a
danger to the State as monopoly of
political decision-making, so the most
determining political clash is the one
between multitude and people. The
multitude, ‘the many’, preceded the
State which is established through the
endowment of a single will, incarnated
by the unity of people. Thus, the
concept of people is “strictly correlated
to the existence of the State;
furthermore, it is a reverberation, a
reflection of the State: if there is a
State, then there are people. In the
absence of the State, there are no
people” (Virno, 2004: 22). The
multitude, adds Virno to Hobbes’
interpretation, resists unity and
authority because it never transfers its
‘state of nature’ to the sovereign (in
opposition to people). In this way,
multitude becomes a negative
borderline concept (multitude as what
people is not) which denies state
sovereignty and the delegation of
people’s power to the sovereign (to
represent and unify people’s will). The
terrain of multitude is clearly civil
society and not the state, to which
people belong.
Virno, in line with Hardt and Negri,
places the multitude at the stateless
level and people at the state. The idea
that if there is no State, there are no
people illustrates quite well, in my
opinion, the difficulties experienced by
populism to pursue a transnational
populist project. The articulation of ‘the
people’ is still constrained to the state
and sovereignty and it is quite
complicated to imagine ‘the people’
beyond the state boundaries. However,
the conception of people as political
unity which transfers its power to the
sovereign can be qualified or, directly,
contested. Firstly, populism is namely
bounded by the limits of the state but it
has mainly been a reaction against the
exclusionary state and its appropriation
by the elites that utilize it to their own
benefit. In other words, populism is
also a sort of ‘repressed experience’
which returns to the state and reclaims
its representation by announcing its
exclusion. Reducing people to a
category of domination obscures the
potential of ‘the people’ as a category
of resistance. In this regard, multitude
and ‘the people’ share their rejection
of current forms of representation but
differ in their goal: since multitude
refuses any kind of representation, ‘the
people’ aims to improve existing forms
of representation. In this process, the
populist mobilizations, coming from the
civil society arena, end up being
articulated and becoming part of the
political representation. Secondly and
back to the initial point, there is certain
confusion between equivalence and
unity (or identity). It is commonplace
that ‘the people’ is a homogenous
group, where plurality is erased,
through the unifying operation of the
logic of equivalence. That can be the
case and populism can evolve into a
homogenous group, but the transversal
dimension of populism points rather to
the opposite: an inclusive appeal to the
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articulation of ‘the many’ and their
demands.
Chantal Mouffe insists on the
importance of establishing a chain of
equivalence; this means that “it is
equivalence we are after, not identity”
(2018). She is critical of Hardt and
Negri’s multitude because they expect
an automatic convergence of the
plurality of struggles (immanence). The
commonality of the social struggles is
that they share a common adversary.
The operation of unifying is applied to
forge a common agenda on the basis of
their opposition to an adversary. The
commonality is constructed in negative
terms, against the adversary, and the
plurality of groups, including internal
disagreements, contradictions or
tensions between them, persists. The
chain of equivalence is neither a
rainbow coalition nor a unified subject.
Mouffe clarifies that the chain of
equivalence “is not about uniting all
demands into one single and
homogeneous movement. This
grouping of forces simply begins to see
themselves in solidarity with one
another and disadvantaged by the
existing power structure. Each link in
the chain remains distinct, but they
begin to operate together, in concert”
(2016). Following Mouffe’s argument,
the articulation of ‘the people’ is not
incompatible with heterogeneity. The
equivalence does not affect the
particular and differentiated internal
identities of the group. It should be
noticed that the articulation of ‘the
people’ is quite vulnerable since it
depends on having a common
adversary. The tensions between
movements and parties (some of them
becoming part of the governments) can
alter the chain of equivalence and
unveil the fragility of ‘the people’. This
clearly happens when some parties
start to be perceived by the
movements as part of the
establishment. It can also happen that
left-wing parties or governments do
not seem receptive to satisfying
movements’ demands, which can imply
that those demands are articulated
with the claims of other parties. The
vulnerability is reduced if populism is
understood merely as representation
of the demands, particularly by a
political leader. This is the case of many
populist experiences where the
plurality of movements does not play a
major role and the role of the leader as
unifier of demands prevails. The
articulation of ‘the people’ relies then
on the ability to define a lasting
common adversary in order to have a
common project and preserve the
plurality within. In any case, the
articulation around political leaders can
unify the representation of the
demands but also provoke internal
disagreement and ruptures, not to
mention that representation can be
prioritized and blur the relevance of
the movements in questioning the
political system. If the latter were the
case, we would be quite close to the
marginalization of the multitude as
singled out by Virno.
The notion of multitude raises doubts
about the formation of an alternative
against Empire. In a similar way to
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Mouffe disclaiming the comparison
between unity and equivalence, Hardt
and Negri complain about the
confusion between spontaneity and
organization. Hardt and Negri consider
that change will come from the
potentials of existing forms of life and
the emerging social struggles. This
standpoint has been understood as
change coming from the spontaneous
struggles of the multitude. However,
Hardt and Negri have emphasized the
need to organize social struggles but
refuse to articulate those struggles
(which would imply an operation of
transcendence). Although Hardt and
Negri introduce the combination of
horizontal and vertical axes and the
constitution of the multitude as a
construction of counterpowers, it is
unclear how the alternative to Empire
is constituted. The republican global
program formulated in Empire
surprised in being phrased as a sort of
universal rights. The later emphasis on
the institutions of the common and the
organizing of capacities for social
production and reproduction better
reflected the alternative as forged by
the multitude. The formation of a new
Prince, constituted by counterpowers
expressed by the multitude of
producers and reproducers, will be
responsible for initiating a process of
constituent power. The moment in
which the factors to initiate constituent
power converge is, obviously, not
specified, but it sounds a bit
paradoxical that the new Prince is
already conformed by the producers
and reproducers of counterpowers
and, at the same time, the new Prince
needs to produce counterpowers
against the repressive power. The
question about how organization works
and elaborates an alternative to Empire
remains open.
I want to finalize the reflection on ‘the
people’ and multitude with a
consideration regarding their uses.
Multitude has barely become part of
social movements (it was assumed by
the autonomy movement principally
during the alterglobalization) and its
multiplicity is perceived as a weak
strategy to achieve social and political
goals. The problems derived by the
attributed unity to ‘the people’ are of a
different nature. But it is surprising that
‘the people’ is considered an empty
signifier but multitude is not, although
the pluralities of social struggles (or the
constituent against the constituted)
obtain their commonality by being
named as multitude. ‘The people’ and
multitude would in this case be
categories pointing to different types of
strategies and goals, which reflects the
tensions between movements and
parties, expression and participation,
horizontality and verticality, rather
than exclusionary dichotomies.
Sovereign and Non-sovereign
Both discussing the scale (global or
national) and the subject, the
underlying question is how sovereignty
is conceptualized. Hardt and Negri are
categorical when they claim that
Imperial sovereignty marks a paradigm
shift that renders many theories and
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political projects obsolete and
insufficient. Power is no longer
concentrated by the nation-states but
decentralized. Hardt and Negri
summarize briefly and quite clearly
which distinctions mark the passage
from modern to imperial sovereignty:
“from the people to the multitude,
from dialectical opposition to the
management of hybridities, from the
place of modern sovereignty to the
non-place of Empire, from crisis to
corruption” (2000: 202-203). In the
following, I highlight how Hardt and
Negri do not consider the return of the
state or of modern sovereignty a
desirable option (as a transition at its
best) and how their option to
counteract Imperial sovereignty
consists of the foundation of non-
sovereign institutions.
Modern sovereignty is an obstacle
since the subject of change, the
multitude, was excluded and its
potential was replaced with people, a
unified subject that gives the power to
the sovereign (logic of transcendence).
Imperial sovereignty as a global space
(or non-space) without distinction
between inside and outside enables the
emergence of the multitude (the logic
of immanence), as plurality not
constrained by the borders of the
nation-state. This is a complex
scenario. On the one hand, Empire
seems like a liberating force, in
opposition to nation-states, and can
easily be understood as a progressive
move, but on the other hand, it is
pertinent to remember that Empire is a
system of domination (just at the
global scale and with the nation-states
losing control). The impetus for moving
to Empire and rejecting national
sovereignty as a viable option creates a
considerable distance between Hardt
and Negri’s approach and other left-
wing projects, including populism. It
explains why, unfairly, the authors of
Empire have been labeled global
reformists and defenders of global
capitalism. A second dimension must
be added. It is not only modern
sovereignty which is transcendent.
Sovereignty in itself is defined by
transcendence and representation. The
politics of multitude cannot be
successfully carried out under the
umbrella of sovereignty, and
representation cannot be the goal. The
rejection of representative politics, as
defining sovereignty, creates again a
huge distance between the theory on
Empire and other theories and political
proposals. The only desirable option is
to create non-sovereign institutions. In
their claim for a new paradigm, Hardt
and Negri fix strongly separated
dichotomies between Empire vs.
Imperialism, Imperial sovereignty vs.
modern sovereignty, sovereignty vs.
non-sovereignty and expression vs.
representation. This framework makes
it difficult to account for institutional
claims by the multitude, the defense of
popular sovereignty by movements and
parties, the potentials (and limitations)
of achieving state and local power or
the formation of hybrid forms of
representation and participation such
as movement-parties. Without denying
its necessity and potential,
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the battlefield drawn by Hardt and
Negri is quite unclear since it differs
from other political projects by not
aiming to take power or gain political
representation. The multitude, not
articulated and safeguarded from
transcendence, would be meant for
local struggles through organizing
existing forms of production and
reproduction.
The Pink Tide in Latin America offered,
however, a more concrete image of the
materialization of the resistance
against Empire. Without sharing the
means or the goals, Hardt and Negri
sympathized with the Latin American
progressive political processes, some of
them labeled left-wing populism. In his
participation in a dialogue about
Bolivia, Negri (2008) referred to the
situation, which could be expanded to
other Latin American countries, as a
passage of transition. The elements of
transition are basically two: the shift
from representation to expression, and
from sovereignty to interdependence,
although a third one could be added:
from government to governance. The
relation between representation (the
government) and expression (the
movements) is characterized by a
constituent exodus, resulting in
multitudes’ resistance and claim to
power (albeit a different power from
the previous one), whose aim is to
move beyond capitalism. In the same
forum, Hardt considers too the
‘Bolivian experiment’ as a transition
through a democratic openness (and
not a dictatorship). Transition should
“constitute a people, a multitude
capable of self-government; create a
dynamic between government and
social movements, and thus be able to
transform the human nature in a more
positive manner everyday” (Hardt et
al., 2008: 54). Together with this
process of democratic deepening, the
passage from dependence to
interdependence is explored by Cocco
and Negri in GlobAL. As happens with
other claims to return to modern
sovereignty, the national-
developmentalist strategy is rejected,
and governing of interdependence is
suggested as an alternative to both
national-developmentalist and
capitalist market-oriented
interdependence generated by Empire.
Cocco and Negri seem to apply the
expansive nature of immanence to
move from the national to the regional
scale. This move provoked furious
reactions from parts of the left since
the reinforcement of national
sovereignty is considered a legitimate
strategy against imperialism and
necessary for Latin American countries.
It must be noted that the governments
which were considered radical-left
(Venezuela, Bolivia) defended the
return of state sovereignty whilst the
ones of center-left (Brazil, Uruguay)
opted for major regional openness. As
mentioned, the transition implies that,
in the best case, we witness a passage
to absolute democracy and multitude’s
self-organization. However, the
openness in terms of conceiving
government (as a mixed form of
movements and party) and sovereignty
(as interdependent and not necessarily
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limited to nation-states) entails
important elements to establish a
serious dialogue with the complicated
intersection between representation
and participation as well as the national
and international arenas to think of
more complex ways of representative
democracy and multi-scalar
sovereignty.
Despite a similar situation taking place
in Europe when Syriza took power in
Greece and Podemos became the third
most voted party in Spain, Hardt and
Negri did not consider the option of
‘transition’ as an autonomous project;
not even when municipalism gained
force as a local institutional alternative.
Hardt and Negri maintain that
constituent power, at least as its end, is
not compatible with representation
and sovereignty, and they leave out
any possible connection with populism
due to their opposition to the people as
political union: “Conceiving of
constituent power as a swarm concept,
as a multitudinous pluralism means
breaking with every fetishistic
conception of political union and thus
critiquing the concepts of the people
and the nation for the ways they have
traditionally been posed as unities”
(2007: 37). Abandoning sovereignty
becomes a prerequisite for the
multitude to leave behind the
sovereign relationship of power and
domination and the mandate for unity.
Taking power does not mean then to
reach the government but, for a
multitude, to invent non-sovereign
institutions. If modern sovereignty has
been replaced by imperial sovereignty,
the constituent exodus consists,
according to Hardt and Negri, of
creating non-sovereign institutions
grounded in practices and spaces of
resistance. Their proposal relies on
strengthening the connection between
the social and the political, instead of
conceiving them as two autonomous
and separate arenas, to promote real
democracy where a multitude self-
organizes and makes political decisions,
or, in more populist words, where ‘the
people’ is capable of ruling itself
collectively. The different goals of left-
wing populism and Hardt and Negri’s
approach (popular sovereignty vs. non-
sovereign institutions) accentuate their




Before concluding, I would like to
return to the starting point and reflect
upon how theories and studies on
populism can benefit from the
perspective of Empire (this question is
likewise applicable to how to read
Empire from a populist perspective).
The main focus has been on differences
and the projects thus seem almost
incommensurable. I summarize in the
following table some of the main
differences (as it has been singled out
in this article there are several others
as well) which contribute to a
dichotomist way of seeing both
approaches. I have labeled Hardt and
Negri’s perspective operaismo
(workerism), and left-wing populism
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refers especially to its formulation by
Laclau and Mouffe.
Table 1 (page 69)
As illustrated here, the two projects
present considerable differences,
although there are many more
positions in-between than those
framed as dichotomies. It is true that
Hardt and Negri’s proposal can be
understood as a populism without
sovereignty and representation.
Following Rousseau, Hardt and Negri
refer to the impossibility of political
representation: However, the authors
warn in Assembly that this claim does
not lead to the defense of participation
or direct democracy but to
guaranteeing sovereignty through
‘general will’ as a form of
representation. The general will
becomes a unanimous political subject
which represents all through the
unifying effect of representation. On
the contrary, the ‘will of all’ consists of
organization of social cooperation and
reproduction of social life without any
representative mandate. In other
words, sovereignty entails unity and is
incompatible with plurality: “Whereas
the will of all, because of its plurality, is
inimical to sovereignty, the general will,
unified and indivisible, is sovereign”
(2017: 27). The populist version of
Hardt and Negri would be that of the
‘will of all’ where multitude replaces
‘the people’ in order to preserve
plurality. However, Imperial
sovereignty should draw a more
complex panorama where there are
coexisting and intertwined forms of
sovereignty both geographically (local,
regional, national, global) and in terms
of power/resistance (from below, from
above). Likewise, to avoid unity and
promote plurality, forms of
participation and direct action should
be combined with representation, but
also the composition of the political
subject should be reconsidered.
Therefore, I conclude with two main
topics to rethink the scope of
sovereignty (multi-scale) and the
plurality of the political subject
(intersectionality).
Multi-scalar
Hardt and Negri chose Empire to name
a new global power structure and a
new form of sovereignty which does
not correspond with a global state
since its structure is decentralized.
Although the use of Empire has not had
a huge predicament, only within
operaismo and not always, it grasps a
period of definition of political and
social struggles in which ‘old’ schemas
cannot account for the ‘new’ reality.
This is clear when Hardt and Negri
claim that there is no longer an outside
and they reject the inside vs. outside
divide. Globalization is both “processes
of homogenization and
heterogenization. Rather than creating
one smooth space, the emergence of
Empire involves the proliferation of
borders and hierarchies at every
geographical scale, from the space of
the single metropolis to that of the
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great continents” (Hardt & Negri, 2020:
73). Furthermore, an understanding of
globalization as a phenomenon from
above would be insufficient without
including the forces of globalization
from below. I share indeed such a
framework and consider that the
populist focus on popular sovereignty
has made transnational articulations
difficult, and it reproduces the
antagonist conflict at the global scale:
globalization from above vs.
globalization from below. Hardt and
Negri replace the spatial metaphor
inside vs. outside with the one between
below vs. above. At this point, it would
look like Hardt and Negri’s approach
could be used, although they would
disagree, to elaborate the notion of
transnational populism. How to
organize (and articulate) such a
transnational populism in times of
Imperial sovereignty remains uncertain.
However, I would like to highlight that
globalization, according to Hardt and
Negri, is both homogenization and
heterogenization, and that implies the
emergence of new borders at every
geographical scale. Despite there not
being an outside, the construction of
inside/outside oppositions continues to
flourish, and the process of resistance
(the globalization from below)
is equally exposed to the tension
between preserving its plurality and
finding commonalities (without that
implying unity). It is here that I see that
populism entails potential to address
some of the issues raised by
Empire. Although being quite different
in their nature and scope, ‘the people’
does not reproduce, as deductible from
its opposition to multitude, the
dichotomy unity vs. multiplicity. ‘The
people’, at least in the sense attributed
by Laclau and Mouffe, entails a
plurality which is articulated through a
chain of equivalence against a common
enemy. Hardt and Negri reject this
operation because they consider it to
be transcendent, but the fact is that it
does not necessarily reduce ‘the
people’ to unity. Indeed, taking
seriously the idea of geographical scale,
it is difficult not to recognize the
importance of the national space. It is
true that reclaiming national
sovereignty is a symptom more of its
crisis and the impossibility of
recovering it. In any case, it would be a
mistake to reduce popular sovereignty
to national sovereignty and to equalize
the unity of ‘the people’ as a result of
sovereignty with the claim of ‘the
people’ to reshape sovereignty based
on the conflict between ‘the elite’ and
‘the people’. The capacity of
sovereignty to produce identities
through the divide inside/outside
should not be ignored but neither
compared with the attempt to question
the existing representative
democracies through the elite/people
divide (already in social movements’
articulations like the one between the
99% vs. the 1%).
In short, rather than saying that a
populist reading of Empire can
contribute to developing the concept of
transnational populism, I would claim
that it would be useful to elaborate
a conceptualization of multi-scalar
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populism where social and political
struggles take place at the urban (or
local), national and transnational levels
and, although difficult, can maintain
their autonomy and be connected. The
urban experiences (from movements
but also from municipalism), the
national popular movements
(particularly, left-wing parties) and the
transnational experiments (still quite
shy and incipient like DiEM25 or Plan B)
portray a complex picture of the
struggles within globalization or
Empire. The shift to passages like
governance (the combination of
movements and parties and
interdependence) can be useful as well
as the intersectionality nature of ‘the
people’ (and the multitude).
Intersectional
When revisiting Empire 20 years later,
Hardt and Negri revisit their concept of
multitude. They insist on their interest
in how a multiplicity can act politically
and not in how only ‘the one’ can
decide, so their rejection of a unified
political subject (a centralized
leadership council, an electoral party or
‘a people’) remains the same.
However, what I find interesting is how
they redefine multitude which has
been a quite ambivalent concept with
limited impact in its use politically.
Hardt and Negri propose, indeed, a
redefinition of class based on the
formula C-M-C’, class-multitude-class
prime. The idea is to understand class
in terms of multiplicity and not
an internally unified subject. To
conceptualize class as multitude, Hardt
and Negri deploy intersectionality as a
political theory of multiplicity to
acknowledge that no one structure of
domination is primary to the others,
and that subjectivity is there as a
multiplicity of subjectivities (in the
same way that there is multiplicity of
structures of domination). The key here
is precarity which can be related to the
working class, as labor precarity, and to
intersectionality, as precarious life
where increasing insecurity affects a
wide range of subordinated groups.
Hardt and Negri show their
understanding of the sense of loss,
particularly by trade unions and
working-class parties, but they believe
that the shift from class to multitude is
the only way to have a consistent and
sustainable project of class politics,
defined by being feminist, antiracist
and queer too. The interesting move is
the suggestion to return to the concept
of class to explore the potential of a
multitude and its political action. The
return to class from multitude would
imply to move “from a unified political
conception based on a single axis of
domination, that determined by
capital, to a multiplicity, which also
engages patriarchy, white supremacy
and other axes” (2020: 87). Class
revisited through multitude (or class
prime) is not a socio-economic
category but has larger implications: 1)
it grasps the effects of subjection
created by different relations of
domination, not only those provoked
by capital; 2) it is a political call, not a
descriptive claim, to struggle together
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as a class; 3) the recognition of
a plurality of dominated classes is
not enough, and an internal articulation
of these different subjectivities in
struggle is necessary. The problem
highlighted by Hardt and Negri is that
this articulation can easily rely on
external bonds of solidarity (back to the
issue of transcendence) instead of what
is really necessary: internal bonds of
solidarity, meaning a mode of
articulation which goes beyond
standard conceptions of coalition.
The challenge for this redefinition of
class is to maintain multiplicity and
avoid the reduction to sameness. The
concept of multitudinous or
intersectional class is offered as
alternative to a coalition: “a notion of
class that is not only composed of a
multiplicity, and grounded in forms of
social cooperation and the common,
but also articulated by internal bonds
of solidarity and intersection among
struggles, each recognizing that the
others are ‘a chapter of their own
social and political history’” (2020: 91).
The resulting notion of class (class
prime) is internally articulated,
preserves multiplicity and is equally
oriented to diverse struggles (against
capital, patriarchy, white supremacy
and other types of domination). This
mode of articulation or assembly can
be seen as recovering the centrality of
class but renewed in a context of
multiple dominations, not reducible to
the relation between labor and capital.
Besides offering a more convincing
conception of multitude as
intersectional class, Hardt and Negri
come quite close to the core
of populism and the articulation of
‘the people’. They claim that the
movement from class or the people to
multitude is not a political mandate but
an accomplished fact which has
manifested itself over the past twenty
years. Populist theory would say
something similar but applied to the
movement from class to the people.
But interestingly enough, Hardt and
Negri renew the concept of class but
not the one of the people, although
they could also do that. If ‘the people’
moved to multitude, is it not possible
to imagine a renewed comeback for
‘the people’ (the people prime) after
multitude, a form of intersectional
people? The focus on the internal
bonds and the multiplicity of ‘enemies’
highlights the contrast to populist
theory. Nonetheless, Hardt and Negri’s
definition of intersectional class sounds
quite similar to the logics of difference
and equivalence and the articulation of
‘the people’, although through a
constitutive outside. The suggestion to
preserve plurality and avoid unity
(especially in the form of leader) as
well as to address different types of
domination (from economic inequality
to climate change) is a promising way
to expand the populist project through
an intersectional perspective.
All in all I believe that, beyond the
differences, an open dialogue between
operaismo (in the version of Hardt and
Negri) and left-populist theory can be a





articulation, national vs. global)
and move to a space of hybridity.
This hybridity is a transition to
something else that is difficult to define
now. What is clear is that Empire (the
global system of production and
reproduction and of global governance)
entails a huge challenge concerning
how to combat efficiently against (and
within). The only option so far is to
imagine how to re-scale the struggles
(local, national and transnational),
but imagination and creativity are
much needed to materialize it as
an alternative to globalization from
above where the political subject
(‘the people’, multitude, class) is
capable of articulating multiplicity of
struggles and claims in an international
manner.
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In 2000 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
announced a new global paradigm that
implied the shift from modern
sovereignty to imperial sovereignty.
Until now, they have developed a
theoretical and political framework to
account for the organization of
multitude, a counter-Empire from
below, to overcome the multiple and
decentralized modes of domination
characterizing Empire. Since multiplicity
and immanence are the main features of
the struggles of multitude, Hardt and
Negri have rejected the return of the
state, representative politics or ‘the
people’ as subject of change. This
position has made it difficult to establish
a deeper dialogue with other
approaches like populism (or left-
populism) by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe, despite the relevant reflections
and implications for populism contained
in the work of Hardt and Negri. This
article engages in a critical reading of
populism from the Empire perspective
where special focus is placed on the
construction of incompatible
dichotomies between globalization vs.
the state, multitude vs. ‘the people’, and
non-sovereignty vs. popular sovereignty.
After discussing tensions and issues from
both Empire and populist theory, the
conclusion points to the application of a
multi-scalar and intersectional approach
to populism in order to enrich its
conceptualization and solve some of its
contradictions. Keywords: Imperial
sovereignty; national sovereignty;
multitude; the people ; multi-scalar;
intersectionality.
Resumen
En 2000 Michael Hardt y Antonio Negri
anunciaron un nuevo paradigma global
que implicaba el cambio de la soberanía
moderna a la soberanía imperial. Hasta
ahora, han desarrollado un marco
teórico y político para dar cuenta de la
organización de la multitud, un
contraimperio desde abajo, para superar
los múltiples y descentralizados modos
de dominación que caracterizan al
Imperio. Dado que la multiplicidad y la
inmanencia son las principales
características de las luchas de la
multitud, Hardt y Negri han rechazado el
regreso del Estado, la política
representativa o "el pueblo" como
sujeto de cambio. Esta posición ha
dificultado el establecimiento de un
diálogo más profundo con otros
enfoques como el populismo (o
populismo de izquierda) de Ernesto
Laclau y Chantal Mouffe, a pesar de las
relevantes reflexiones e implicaciones
para el populismo contenidas en la obra
de Hardt y Negri. Este artículo realiza
una lectura crítica del populismo desde
la perspectiva del Imperio, donde se
pone especial énfasis en la construcción
de dicotomías incompatibles entre
globalización versus Estado, multitud
versus "pueblo" y no soberanía versus
soberanía popular. Palabras clave:
soberanía imperial; soberanía nacional;
multitud; el pueblo ; multiescalar;
interseccionalidad.
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